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I. INTRODUCTION & ISSUE

As wireless telephones (cell phones) burst into mainstream culture in
the early 2000s,' Jeremy, then a teenager, begged his parents for his
* J.D. expected May 2012; University of Florida, Levin College of Law; B.A. in
Political Science and International Relations, 2006; Boston University. I would like to thank
Jennie Zilner and all the other members and editors of the Journal of Technology Law & Policy
for their assistance in bringing this Note to completion. Lastly, I dedicate this to Phil Koch, who
served as the inspiration for this Note and who continues to inspire me in every facet of my life.
1. The CTIA-The Wireless Association, an industry trade group, estimates that from
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own cell phone. Despite their initial resistance, Jeremy had his first cell
phone at age sixteen. At first, Jeremy's love affair was tempered by the
realization that talking on his cell phone for hours on end was a costly
endeavor. Then, as cell phone companies began to offer "unlimited"
nighttime minutes, Jeremy was able to use his phone for his hours-long
conversations with friends. When Jeremy went away to college, he
balked at the idea of having a landline. Instead, he relied on his cell
phone to keep in touch with his family and friends back home. Jeremy
never worried as his monthly minutes soared because he confined his
usage to times when the minutes were "free."
But were they really free? In a financial sense, yes, but research has
led many to question whether long-term heavy cell phone use carries
with it alarming health risks. 2 Those risks became abundantly clear to
Jeremy when he was diagnosed with a highly malignant form of brain
cancer in his late twenties. Although science on the subject remains
muddied, Jeremy could not help but wonder whether his cell phone
usage contributed to the development of his cancer by exposing him to
unsafe levels of radiofrequency (RF) radiation. 3 Tucked away deep in
the insert for his iPhone was a warning that users should operate their
phones at least 5/8th an inch from the body 4 -a warning that Jeremy
and virtually all iPhone users never heeded, in part because they were
not aware that such a warning existed. Given that Jeremy was never
fully aware of the radiation risk from cell phone usage, he never used a
headset when operating his cell phone, which would have significantly
June 2001 to June 2006, wireless penetration in the United States increased from nearly 41% to
over 72%. Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/aid/
10323 (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). Wireless penetration is defined as the number of active units
divided by the total U.S. population. Id.
2. See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Law Carries a Ring of Fear; Cellphone Industry Attacks San
Francisco'sRuling on Radiation, WASH. PosT, June 20, 2010, at Al (quoting a professor of
oncology and cancer epidemiology as stating that long-term cell phone use corresponds with "a
consistent pattern of increased risk for" the development of certain types of malignant brain
tumors); Randall Stross, Should You Be Snuggling With Your Cellphone?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2010, at BU4 (describing inconclusive study results); Wolters Kluwer Health, Best Available
Evidence Links Cell Phone Use to Brain Tumors, NEWSWISE (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.news
wise.com/articles/best-available-evidence-links-cell-phone-use-to-brain-tumors-reports-the-jou
rnal-of-computer-assisted-tomography (reporting results of recent study finding that "'[1]ong
term cell phone usage can approximately double the risk of developing a glioma or acoustic
neuroma in the more exposed brain hemisphere"').
3. For a discussion of RF radiation, see infra Part II.
4. iPhone 4 Important Product Information Guide, available at http://manuals.info.
apple.com/enUS/iPhone_4 ImportantProductInformationGuide.pdf (last visited Oct. 1,
2011 ("When using iPhone near your body for voice calls or for wireless data transmission over
a cellular network, keep iPhone at least 15 mm (5/8 in.) away from the body, and only use
carrying cases . . . ."); iPhone 3G Important Product Information Guide, at 7, available at
http://manuals.info.apple.com/enUS/iPhone_3GImportantProductInformation Guide.pdf
(same).
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reduced Jeremy's RF radiation exposure.
If Jeremy demonstrates a sufficient causal linkage between cell
phone usage and the development of his brain cancer, is he able to bring
a state law cause of action to recover damages from certain cell phone
manufacturers? Depending on the jurisdiction in which Jeremy brings
his claim, surprisingly, the answer may be no.6 The uncertainty
surrounding Jeremy's ability to bring such an action hinges, in part, on
whether the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) RF
emissions standards preempt state law claims challenging the adequacy
of those levels. 7
The answer to that question is an important one as there are an
estimated 322.9 million cell phone wireless subscriptions in the United
States, a figure greater than the entire U.S. population.8 As of June
2011, nearly 30% of the nation's households were wireless-only. 9 In
light of the pervasiveness of cell phones in American culture, if the now
theoretical health risks associated with cell phone usage become reality,
mass litigation will ensue. The extent to which federal law may preempt
such state tort litigation is the subject of this Note.
II. BACKGROUND ON RF RADIATION

To fully understand the nature of the potential linkage between cell
phones and brain tumors, it is helpful to define RF radiation and to
assess its potential impact on humans. Many electronic products use
some form of electromagnetic energy'o to operate." One form of
5.

See, e.g., Office of Eng'g and Tech., Radiofrequency Safety--Frequently Asked

Questions, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, http://www.fcc.gov/oet/rfsafety/rf-faqs.html (last updated
Aug. 4, 2010) [hereinafter FCC RF FAQ] ("[U]se of an ear piece connected to a mobile phone
will significantly reduce the rate of energy absorption (or SAR) in the user's head.").
6. Appellate courts are split with respect to this issue. Compare Farina v. Nokia, Inc.,
625 F.3d 97, 133-34 (3d Cir. 2010) and Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 777 (D.C.
2009), with Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 456-57 (4th Cir. 2005). This split was recently
highlighted in cert briefing before the U.S. Supreme Court. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
24-25, Farina v. Nokia, Inc., No. 10-1064 (U.S. filed Feb. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 704764.
Although the Court sought the Solicitor General's input on the issue, the Court ultimately
denied cert. See Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 79 U.S.L.W. 3514 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011) (No. 10-1064).
7. See Farina,625 F.3d at 133-34; Murray, 982 A.2d at 777; Pinney, 402 F.3d at 45657.
8. Wireless Quick Facts, supra note 1 (statistics are as of June 2011).
9. Id.
10. Electromagnetic energy is defined as "the energy source required to transmit
information (in the form of waves) from one place (material) to another." Aishwarya Nirmal,
What is Electromagnetic Energy?, BUZZLE.COM, http://www.buzzle.com/articles/what-iselectromagnetic-energy.htmi (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
11. See Robert F. Cleveland, Jr. & Jerry L. Ulcek, Questions and Answers about
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electromagnetic energy that is particularly important to the
telecommunications sector is called RF energy, or radio waves. 12 Radio
waves are created as a result of the movement of electrical charges in
antennas.1 3 The resultant waves then radiate away from the antenna at
the speed of light.14
In the case of cell phones, every time a person speaks during a phone
call, that person's voice is converted into radio waves. Those radio
waves are then transmitted from the cell phone's antenna to a nearby
base station antenna." The base station antenna then routes the call
through the telephone network until it reaches its intended recipient.16
Because RF energy is emitted through an antenna within the phone, the
proximity of a cell phone to the user's head is positively correlated with
increased exposure to RF radiation.
It is widely accepted that exposure to high levels of RF radiation can
heat human tissue, thereby causing potentially harmful biological
effects to those exposed.18 However, it is less clear whether exposure to
the lower levels of RF radiation that typify cell phone usage can cause
similarly harmful biological effects, even when the levels are not strong
enough to measurably heat human tissue. 19 Although scientists are
actively researching that question, studies to date have proven
"inconclusive." 20 In June 2010, researchers published the results of a
thirteen-country INTERPHONE study, which is the largest study of its
kind.2 ' INTERPHONE researchers found no statistically significant link
between the development of certain brain tumors and normal amounts
Biological Effects and Potential Hazards of Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields, FED.
COMMC'NS COMM'N OFFICE OF ENG'G & TECH.
documents/bulletins/#56.

1 (1999),

http://www.fcc.gov/oet/info/

12. Radiofrequency Background, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Radiation-EmittingProducts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/HomeBusinessandEntert
ainment/CellPhones/ucml 16338.htm (last updated Mar. 10, 2009).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See FCC Encyclopedia: FAQS-Wireless Phones, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, http://
www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/faqs-wireless-phones (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. FCC RFFAQ, supra note 5.
19. Id. ("At relatively low levels of exposure to RF radiation ... the evidence for
production of harmful biological effects is ambiguous and unproven.").
20. Id. ("Results to date have been inconclusive."). Cell phone studies come in two
forms: they are either epidemiological in nature, or controlled experiments conducted in
laboratories. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-545, TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
RESEARCH AND REGULATORY EFFORTS ON MOBILE PHONE HEALTH ISSUES 9-11 (2001), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0I545.pdf

21. INTERPHONE Study Grp., Brain Tumour Risk in Relation to Mobile Telephone Use:
Results of the INTERPHONE InternationalCase-ControlStudy, 39 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 675,
685 (2010).
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of cell phone usage.22 However, researchers suggested that there may be
an increased risk of tumor development for heavy cell phone users and
that further inquiry into the long-term effects of heavy cell phone usage
is necessary. Based in part on the results of that study, the World
Health Organization recently classified wireless phones as "possibly
carcinogenic to humans [] based on an increased risk for glioma, a
malignant type of brain tumor, associated with wireless phone use." 24
Although the danger, if any, associated with cell phone usage will no
doubt become more defined as science progresses, all studies to date
suffer from the same general uncertainty. This uncertainty is due, in
part, to the difficulty in gathering reliable information regarding cell
phone usage.26 Specifically, study participants may not perfectly recall
their pattern of cell phone use over the years, particularly if those
participants are afflicted with a brain tumor that inhibits overall memory
function.27 The uncertainty may also be attributed to the often decadeslong latency period between RF exposure and the formation of a brain
tumor.28 As widespread cell phone usage is a relatively recent
occurrence in the United States, reliable long-term data accounting for
22. Id. at 688.
23. Id. When examining the data in greater detail, it appears that users who talk on the
cell phone thirty minutes a day or more have a 40% greater risk of developing gliomas, a highly
malignant type of brain tumor. Press Release, Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich, Kucinich
Introduces Cell Phone Research, Warning Label Bill (June 30, 2010), available at
http://kucinich.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=192995). The increased
risk rises to 96% for cell phone users who use their cell phone primarily on one side of their
head. Id.
24. Press Release, World Health Org., Int'l Agency for Research on Cancer, IARC
Classifies Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields as Possibly Carcinogenic to Humans (May
31, 2011), available at http://www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/2011/pdfs/pr2O8_E.pdf
The
International Agency for Research on Cancer is tasked with classifying agents according to their
carcinogenicity to humans. Cell phones are in Group 2B (Possibly carcinogenic to humans),
below Group I (Carcinogenic to humans) and Group 2A (Probably carcinogenic to humans). Id.
at 4-5. Possibly carcinogenic means that there is "limited evidence of carcinogenity," or that a
credible "positive association has been observed between exposure to the agent and cancer." Id.
at 5-6.
25. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
26. See Fact Sheet: Cell Phones and Cancer Risk, NAT'L CANCER INST.,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/cellphones (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
27. Id. Compounding this problem is the fact that the U.S. cell phone industry has
declined to release usage statistics for individual cell phone users. See Kang, supra note 2.
Therefore, there is no objective measure by which to verify the accuracy of a cancer patient's
assertions of heavy use, or non-heavy use. Id.
28. Id; see also DEVRA DAVIS, DISCONNECT 56 (2010) (noting that "[an invisible cancer
cell must double thousands of times before it can be detected," and that, as a result, the "latency
period ... can be decades").
29. For instance, the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association estimates that in
December 1995, there were only 33.8 million wireless subscriptions in the United States,
composing 13% of the U.S. population. Wireless Quick Facts, supra note 1. Most recent
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any latency period is not yet available. 30
In the interim, the FCC has stepped into the role of regulating the
level of RF emissions coming from cell phones.3 1 The FCC deems all
cell phones that comply with their RF emissions levels "safe" and
authorizes them for sale in the United States. 32 Because the FCC's
current RF emissions levels still pose a potential, albeit unidentified,
risk to all cell phone users, litigation is, and has been, an inevitable
consequence. The litigation to date has hinged primarily on one issuewhether state law claims that either directly, or indirectly, impose
stricter RF emissions standards than those mandated by the FCC are
preempted under the doctrine of conflict preemption. 33 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit 34 and the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals 35 answered that question in the affirmative, while the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion.3 6
Part III of this Note explores the authority under which the FCC set
its emissions standards and the nature of the standards currently in
place. Part IV addresses the various forms of federal preemption and
examines the applicability of those forms to cell phone radiation claims.
Part V deals specifically with one type of preemption, conflict
preemption, and analyzes the likelihood of a plaintiffs success with
respect to several state law causes of action. Finally, Part VI briefly
concludes with a discussion of the future of cell phone emissions law.
III. FCC REGULATION OF RF RADIATION EMISSIONS

A. FCC'sLegal Authority
Congress established the FCC in 1934 with the passage of the
At the time of
Federal Communications Act of 1934 (FCA).
carrying
out its "purpose
establishment, Congress tasked the FCC with
estimates from June 2011 set the current figure at 322.9 million, or 102.4% of the U.S.
population. Id.
30. Fact Sheet No. 193: Electromagnetic Fields and Public Health: Mobile Phones,
WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs 193/en (last visited Sept.
23, 2011).
31. 47 C.F.R. § 2.1093 (2010).
32. See, e.g., Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 126 (3d Cir. 2010).
33. See id. at 133-34; Murray v. Motorola, Inc. 982 A.2d 764, 777 (D.C. 2009); Pinney v.
Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 456-57 (4th Cir. 2005).
34. Farina,625 F.3d at 133-34.
35. Murray, 982 A.2d at 777.
36. Pinney, 402 F.3d at 456-57.
37. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064-65.

2011]

ARE CELL PHONES SAFE UNTIL THE FCC TELLS US THEYARE NOT? A PREEMPTIONANALYSIS

313

of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio so as to make available .

.

. a rapid, efficient, Nation-

wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges . . . .' To fulfill this mandate,
Congress granted to the FCC the power to "perform any and all acts . . .
as may be necessary in the execution of its functions."3 9 The Supreme
Court has said that the FCC's authority over certain technical details of
the nation's telecommunications network is "clearly exclusive."A0
Nonetheless, the FCA contains a savings clause retaining remedies
"existing at common law or by statute" and providing that the FCA's
provisions "are in addition to such remedies."
It was not until 1985 that the FCC began issuing guidelines for
human exposure to RF radiation from certain FCC authorized
facilities.4 2 At that point, however, the FCC did not include cell phones
within the scope of the regulations.4 3 The FCC proposed those initial
regulations in response to an amendment to the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which imposes an obligation on all federal
agencies to consider "the environmental impact of [their] proposed
action[s]."4 At the outset, the FCC explicitly acknowledged its lack of
expertise in the realm of health and safety standards:
[T]he Commission has concluded that it is necessary to clarify
our responsibilities and intentions with regard to potential
hazards from radiofrequency (RF) and microwave radiation. At
the outset, we would like to stress that the Commission has
neither the expertise nor the primary jurisdiction to promulgate
health and safety standards for RF and microwave radiation. At
the same time, it appears that the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) . .. requires the Commission to consider whether the

equipment and operations it authorizes will "significantly affect
38. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). In 1993, Congress amended the FCC's mission statement to
include cell phones. Specifically, Congress instructed the FCC to "foster the growth and
development of mobile services that, by their nature, operate without regard to state lines as an
integral part of the national telecommunications infrastructure." H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 260
(1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 587.
39. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i).
40. Head v. N.M. Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1963) (citing
47 U.S.C. § 301).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 414.
42. Report and Order, In re Responsibility of the Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n to Consider
Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation When Authorizing the Use of Radiofrequency
Devices, 100 F.C.C.2d 543, 543-44 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Report and Order].
43. See id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (2006). The FCC expressly noted that it enacted the rules
pursuant to NEPA.
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the quality of the human environment." . . . For this reason, we

today propose an amendment to our rules implementing the
National Environmental Policy Act to provide for processing
under our environmental rules of applications for equipment
authorizations or transmitting facilities which do not comply with
all applicable radiation health and safety standards promulgated
by agencies of the federal government. 4 5
As a result of the FCC's admitted inexperience in the field of health and
safety, the FCC adopted radiation guidelines already established by the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI). 46
When ANSI revised its standards in 1993 to include restrictions on
cell phone emissions, the FCC proposed rulemaking again to determine
whether the FCC should adopt those standards.4 7 During the notice and
comment period for the proposed rule, Congress passed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). 8 The TCA directed the FCC
to "make effective rules regarding the environmental effects of [RF]
emissions" within 180 days of the TCA's enactment. 49 Upon enacting
the TCA, Congress expressly preempted certain state law in
telecommunications5 0 and preserved remaining state law through the
inclusion of a savings clause.5 1 At the conclusion of the notice and
comment period, the FCC adopted revised standards that included cell
phones within its regulatory scope.5 2 Just as before, the FCC relied on
standards proposed by other organizations-this time a hybrid of the
ANSI standard and another standard recommended by the National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. Also as before,
the FCC denied any special expertise on matters relating to public
45. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re the Responsibility of the Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n to Consider Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation When Authorizing the
Use of Radiofrequency Devices, 89 F.C.C.2d 214, 251 (1982) (internal citation omitted).
46. 1985 Report and Order, supra note 42, at 551.
47. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental
Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 8 FCC Rcd. 2849, 2850 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking].
48. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
49. Id. § 704(b), 110 Stat. at 152.
50. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2006). That express preemption clause was in addition
to another already existing at the time of the passage of the TCA. See id. § 332 (c)(3)(A).
51. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 143 (codified as a note to
47 U.S.C. § 152). Note that the FCA also contained a savings clause, albeit more general in
nature. See 47 U.S.C. § 414.
52. Report and Order, In re Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of
Radiofrequency Radiation, 11 FCC Rcd. 15123, 15146-47 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Report and
Order]; see also 47 C.F.R. § 2.1093(d)(2) (2010).
53. See 1996 Report and Order, supra note 52, at 15124 nn.l-2.
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health and safety.54
B. CurrentEmissions Standards
The current FCC radiation exposure limits are found at 47 C.F.R. §
2.1093(d) (2010). The limits are expressed in terms of a "specific
absorption rate" (SAR), which is a measure of the rate at which RF
energ emitted by cell phones (and other devices) is absorbed by the
body. * The model from which the SAR standards derive is based on the
Standard Anthropomorphic Man (SAM). 5 6 The SAM is an adult male
weighing in at approximately two hundred pounds with an elevenpound head and a height of six feet two inches. 5 7 Regardless of whether
the user is a child, a woman, or a smaller man, 8 the FCC considers all
phones that comply with the SAR standards safe. 59 Once certified by the
FCC, all compliant cell phones may be legally sold in the United
States. 60
IV. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
A. Types of Preemption
Federal preemption refers to the invalidation of a state law because it
conflicts in some way with existing federal law. 6' The Supremacy
54. Id. at 15134-35 (stressing that the FCC is "not a health and safety agency" and that it
"would defer to the judgment of [] expert agencies with respect to determining appropriate
levels of safe exposure to RF energy"); see also 1993 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra
note 47, at 2850 ("The Commission, however, is not the expert agency for evaluating the effects
of RF radiation on human health and safety. Therefore, it uses standards and guidelines
developed by those with appropriate expertise.").
55. CONSUMER & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N., FACTS:
SAR FOR CELL PHONES: WHAT IT MEANS FOR YOU 1, available at http://www.fcc.gov/

cgb/consumerfacts/sar.html.
56.

DAvIS, supra note 28, at 74.

57. Id.
58. Many have criticized the SAR standards because they do not address, or account for,
the physical differences between the SAM and each individual user. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL
WORKING GROUP, CELL PHONE RADIATION: SCIENCE REVIEW ON CANCER RISKS AND CHILDREN'S

HEALTH 12 (2009), http://ewg.org/project/2009cellphone/cellphoneradiation-fullreport.pdf This
problem is particularly pronounced in children and some estimate that a younger child's head
absorbs twice the radiation of an adult's. Id As a result, a child may receive radiation in an
amount in excess of the FCC standards. Id.
59. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.803(a)(1), 24.50-.52 (2010).
60. See id. § 2.803(a)(1).
61. See, e.g., Dayna B. Royal, Take Your Gun to Work and Leave it in the Parking Lot:
Why the OSH Act Does Not Preempt State Guns-at-Work Laws, 61 FLA. L. REV. 475, 480
(2009). Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 772 (D.C. 2009) (citations omitted).
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Clause of the U.S. Constitution serves as the legal justification for
preemption and provides as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 62
Federal law63 can preempt state law either expressly or impliedly. 64
Express preemption exists when "Congress, through a statute's express
language, declares its intent to displace state law." 6 5 However, a
determination of intent to preempt some state law is just one part of the
analysis, and a reviewing court must look further to "congressional
intent as to the scope" of the intended preemption.66
The second type of preemption, implied preemption, encompasses
both field and conflict preemption.6 7 Field preemption is appropriate
where "federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it." 68 Although extensive regulation in a particular field is a
strong indicator of congressional intent to preempt, it is not

dispositive. 69
Even where Congress has not intended to occupy a legislative field,
federal law may still displace state law to the extent that the two
conflict. 70 This type of preemption is referred to as conflict preemption

62. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
63. It should also be noted that "[flor preemption purposes, federal 'law' includes federal
regulations . . . and state 'law' includes the common law as a basis for judgments in tort suits."
See also Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption andInstitutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 727, 760
(2008).
64. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("Congress' intent may
be 'explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose."' (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
65. Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010).
66. Id. at 118. The Farina court noted that to discern congressional intent, courts "look
primarily to the text of an express preemption provision," but will also "look to the context of
the regulatory scheme as a whole, including its purposes and the way in which Congress
intended it to affect the public and the law." Id.
67. Id. at 115.
68. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Farina, 625 F.3d at 121 (.'Pre-emption should not be inferred, however, simply
because the agency's regulations are comprehensive."' (quoting R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Durham Cnty., 479 U.S. 130, 149 (1986))).
70. Id. at 115.
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and comes in two primary forms.7 ' The first form, called impossibility
preemption,72 is implicated where "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility."7 3 The second form, called
obstacle preemption, mandates preemption where state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."7 The Supreme Court has stated that
"[w]hat is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed
by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose
and intended effects . . . .76
B. Applied PreemptionAnalysis
1. Relevant Appellate Case Law
To date, three appellate courts-two federal and one state-have
decided preemption cases pertaining to the adequacy of FCC RF
exposure limits. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to
address the issue in Pinney v. Nokia, Inc.77 Plaintiffs in that case
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Royal, supra note 61, at 485.
73. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
74. See, e.g., Royal, supra note 61, at 485.
75. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
76. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). The Court
elaborated:
For when the question is whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire
scheme of the statute must of course be considered and that which needs must
be implied is of no less force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the
act cannot otherwise be accomplished-if its operation within its chosen field
else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect-the
state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its
delegated power.
Id. (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
77. 402 F.3d 430, 430 (4th Cir. 2005). By way of background, Pinney dealt with the
claims of five separate classes with lead plaintiffs named Pinney, Farina, Gilliam, Gimpelson,
and Naquin. Id. at 441. All five of those class actions were originally brought in state court, then
removed to various federal courts on federal question jurisdictional grounds. Id Following
removal, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of the actions to the
District of Maryland for purposes of conducting consolidated pre-trial proceedings. Id While
there, the district court dismissed all the actions on the basis of complete preemption and denied
multiple motions to remand. Id. On appeal in Pinney, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
applicability of the complete preemption doctrine and, finding no other basis for federal
jurisdiction, remanded all but one class action. Id. at 451. The one remaining diversity action,
identified by lead plaintiff Naquin, is the only class to which the preemption analysis in Pinney
applies. Id. As is noted infra, one of the dismissed classes-Farina-ultimately received
different treatment by the Third Circuit.
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consisted of cell phone users who were free from brain infirmities and
who bought cell phones without headsets.7 8 Plaintiffs brought several
state law causes of action, seeking punitive damages and compensatory
damages in an amount sufficient for each class member to purchase a
80
79
headset.7 9 Relying on the strong presumption against preemption the
court found that plaintiffs' claims survived express preemption,' field
preemption, 82 and conflict preemption83 inquiries.
In deciding whether awarding damages to purchase headsets
constituted an obstacle to the fulfillment of congressional objectives, the
court focused primarily on the two express preemption clauses and the
two savings clauses found in the FCA and the TCA.8 4 Ultimately, the
court concluded that the framework of those acts indicated stron
congressional intent to retain certain state law causes of action.
Because there was no overarching intent to preclude the precise claims
at issue in Pinney, the court then examined whether allowing the relief
sought would upset the congressional goal of "establishing a nationwide
network of wireless telephone service coverage." 86 Finding that headset
requirements did not upset that goal, the court rejected the preemption
argument. 87
Most recently, the Third Circuit took the opposite view in Farinav.
Nokia, Inc. In Farina,plaintiffs were similar to those in Pinney and
sought similar relief.89 However, unlike the court in Pinney, the Farina
court found the claims barred on the basis of conflict preemption. 90 In
reaching that conclusion, the Third Circuit examined various federal
sources like the TCA and the FCC regulations enacted pursuant to that
authority. In contrast with Pinney, the Farinacourt focused its analysis
on the cause of action, and not on the effect of the specific relief sought

78. Id. at 440.
79. Id. at 440-41. For plaintiffs whose cell phones were not equipped with headset
capability, plaintiffs also sought an injunction compelling the provision of acceptable phones.
Id.
80. See infra Part V.
81. Pinney, 402 F.3d at 456.
82. Id. at 459.
83. Id. at 457-58.
84. Id. at 456-58.
85. Id. at 458.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 625 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2010). For a more detailed explanation of the procedural
background in Farina, see supra note 77. Following the remand in Pinney, the Farina
defendants again removed to federal court (specifically, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
under the Class Action Fairness Act. Id. at 109.
89. Id. at 104, 107; Pinney, 402 F.3d at 440-41.
90. Farina, 625 F.3d at 133-34.
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(like the provision of headsets). 91
With respect to the TCA, the court declined to give "broad effect" to
the TCA's savings clause and instead treated it as "merely one data
point out of many . . . use[d] to discern congressional intent." 92
Examining other "data point[s]," the court found conflict preemption on
the basis of a conflict between the instant litigation and the FCC's
regulations. Specifically, although plaintiffs' argument facially
challenged only the misleading literature accompanying cell phones
indicating that the phone was "safe to operate," the court found that
plaintiffs indirectly challenged the FCC standards themselves. 93 To find
that cell phone manufacturers misrepresented the safety of their product,
the court noted it would have to find, first, that the FCC standards with
which the phones complied were not safe. 94 The court determined such
a finding would upset the balancing process that the FCC underwent in
creating the FCC emissions standards and would frustrate the
congressional purpose of achieving a uniform cellular network and in
entrusting that responsibility in the FCC exclusively. 95
The D.C. Court of Appeals in Murray v. Motorola, Inc.96 fell
somewhere in between the courts' findings in Pinney and Farina.
Unlike Pinney and Farina,plaintiffs in Murray consisted of people who
actually suffered brain injuries, purportedly as a result of their use of
defendants' cell phones. 9 Plaintiffs sought damages on multiple state
law grounds.9 8 The court ultimately found that "insofar as plaintiffs'
claims rest on allegations about the inadequacy of the FCC's RF
radiation standard or about the safety of their FCC-certified cell phones
the claims are preempted under the doctrine of conflict preemption."
In reaching that conclusion, the court limited its discussion of the TCA
savings clause to one sentence, repeating only the oft-cited notion that
savings clauses do not bar a finding of preemption. 00
However, the court carved out certain claims that could proceed
even upon a finding of conflict preemption.o'0 Specifically, the D.C.
91. Id at 133-34.
92. Id. at 131-32.
93. Id. at 133.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 133-34.
96. 982 A.2d 764 (D.C. 2009). Like the Pinney and Farinaactions, Murraybegan in state
court and was later removed to federal court and joined with similar cases in the District of
Maryland. See id. at 768-69. Murray was subsequently remanded back to state court, where it
was ultimately litigated. Id.
97. Id. at 768.
98. Id at 770-71.
99. Id at 777.
100. Id. at 778 n.19.
101. Id. at 781.
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Court of Appeals allowed claims based on the inadequate safety
features of phones manufactured before August 1, 1996 (the date on
which the current FCC SAR standards came into effect).102 In addition,
the court authorized consumer protection claims that were not based on
the adequacy of the FCC standards per se, but on the deceptive nature in
which the safety features of the cell phones were described (i.e., one
warning maintained that the phones were entirely safe).103
In the following sections, this Note elaborates on the preemption
discussion found in Pinney, Farina, and Murray and sets forth the
relevant arguments at both ends of the preemption spectrum. This Note
ultimately adopts, and expands upon, the Pinney court's reasoning.
2. Express Preemption
There are two express preemption clauses potentially applicable to
cell phone radiation claims, but defense attempts to persuade courts of
their applicability failed in Pinney, Farina, and Murray.104 The first
provision, enacted under the TCA, provides: "No State or local
government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement,
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities on
the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to
the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations
concerning such emissions." 0 5 Relying on a broad interpretation of the
word "facilities," cell phone manufacturer defendants in previous
litigation have maintained that cell phones fall within the scope of.
"personal wireless service facilities" 6 because the word "facilities"
includes things "which promote[j the ease of any action, operation,
transaction, or course of conduct." 07 Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have
suggested that the word "facilities" implies a "sense of permanence, as
with a physical structure."' 0 8 Finding that both meanings were plausible,
reviewing courts looked to the "broader context in which 'facility' is
used."' 09 Because the section containing the preemptive language is

102. Id. at 781-82.
103. Id. at 782-83.
104. Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2010); Murray, 982 A.2d at 772;
Pinney, 402 F.3d at 454-57.
105. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2006) (emphasis added).
106. See, e.g., Farina,625 F.3d at 118 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 591 (6th ed. 1990)).
Note that the defendants advanced both arguments in all three cases, with the court reaching the
same conclusion in each case. However, this discussion focuses on Farina solely for brevity
purposes.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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entitled "Preservation of local zoning authority,"" 0 the courts
interpreted this language to mean Congress intended to limit the
As a
provision to physical infrastructure, and not to cell phones.'
result, the court in Farinafound no express preemption with respect to
the first provision.11 2 The courts in Murray and Pinney reached the
same conclusion." 3
The second provision on which cell phone manufacturers relied is
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)." That provision provides that
"no state or local government shall have any authority to regulate the
entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any
private mobile service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a
State from regulating the other terms and conditions of commercial
mobile service."' 15 Defendants argued in Murray, and the trial court so
held, that state law standards imposing more restrictive requirements on
the sale of cell phones indirectly "regulate the entry" of mobile
providers.11 6 The court rejected that argument as excessively broad and

far reaching.117
As the FCC itself admitted, under this logic, any disparate state
requirement with which mobile providers must comply would constitute
a regulation of entry." 8 Yet, such an interpretation reads out the
carefully crafted exception housed within section 332(c)(3)(A)
indicating that states remain free to restrict "the other terms and
conditions of commercial mobile services."' 19 In light of the plain text
of the statutory provision, the Murray court concluded that "'Congress's
intent in enacting [section 332(c)(3)(A)] was to prevent the states from
obstructing the creation of nationwide cellular service coverage, and not
the preemption of health and safety and police powers." 20 The courts in
Farina and Pinney adopted the same logic in rejecting the defendants'
express preemption claims.' 2 '
110.

47 U.S.C.§g332(c)(7).

111.

Farina,625 F.3d at 119.

112. Id. at 120.
113. Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 773 (D.C. 2009); Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402
F.3d 430, 444-45 (4th Cir. 2005).
114. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A); Farina,625 F.3d at 120.

115.

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A).

116. Murray, 982 A.2d at 774.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
120. Murray, 982 A.2d at 774 (quoting Farina v. Nokia, 578 F. Supp. 2d 740, 761 (E.D.
Pa. 2008)).
121. Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 121 (3d Cir. 2010) (although the Farina
defendants did not raise the issue on appeal, the Third Circuit raised the argument sua sponte);
Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 457-58 (4th Cir. 2005).
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3. Field Preemption
As in the case of express preemption, all reviewing appellate courts
have rejected the argument that the FCC emissions standards preempt
state law in the same field.122 The courts have been careful to
distinguish what they perceive as intent to accord FCC "primacy over
the area of technical standards and competitive market structure for
cellular service," from intent to occupy that entire field.123 The most
obvious indication that Congress did not intend to occupy the field is
that the two major acts governing the FCC's regulatory authority in the
area, the FCA and the TCA, contain savings clauses.124 So-called
savings clauses represent deliberate congressional intent to reserve
some role for states within the field.125 Therefore, as the court in Farina
noted, "[t]he presence of a savings provision
'is fundamentally
26
preemption."'l
field
complete
with
incompatible
Despite the unwillingness of appellate courts to entertain the field
preemption defense, the FCC has argued in favor of its applicability.12 7
Specifically, in Murray amicus briefing, the FCC maintained that the
federal government occupies the field of "regulating technical standards
for RF transmissions." 28 The FCC reached that conclusion by
reviewing its historically dominant regulation in the area, purportedly
buttressed by Supreme Court precedent and by the structure of the
FCA.12 In light of these disparate approaches, the decisions of future
courts addressing field preemption issues will likely hinge on the level
of deference accorded to the agency's preemption views.
4. Conflict Preemption
Although defendants in cell phone emissions litigation typically raise
express and field preemption arguments, most litigation to date has
hinged on the issue of conflict preemption. As set forth above, conflict
preemption may apply in two instances-first, "where compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,"l30 and
second, where state "law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
122. Farina,625 F.3d at 121; Murray,982 A.2d at 787; Pinney, 402 F.3d at 458-59.
123. Farina,625 F.3d at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting In re Nos Commc'ns, 495 F.3d 1052, 1968 (9th Cir. 2007)).
127. Brief of FCC as Amicus Curiae at 12-14, Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764
(D.C. 2009) (Nos. 07-1704 to 07-1079).
128. Id at 15.
129. Id at 12-14.
130. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1208 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 31
Because it is possible to simultaneously comply with looser federal
standards and more stringent state standards, the proper inquiry is
whether state tort litigation would frustrate congressional "purposes and
objectives."
V. WYETH V. LEVINE: CONFIRMING THE JUDICIAL PRESUMPTION
AGAINST CONFLICT PREEMPTION

In evaluating the appropriateness of conflict preemption in the cell
phone radiation context, it is important to note that there is a judicial
presumption against preemption. 3 2 This presumption applies with
particular force in cases where, as here, "Congress has 'legislated . . . in

a field which the States have traditionally occupied."'l 33 The Supreme
Court has stressed that the stronger presumption is warranted because
states are "independent sovereigns in our federal system," and it is,
therefore, assumed that "Congress does not [intend to] cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action."134 As a result, reviewing courts must
"start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act," and may stray from that
assumption only upon a finding that preemption "was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."'
Many view the recent Supreme Court opinion in Wyeth v. Levine
as markedly strengthening this presumption, particularly in the realm of
conflict preemption.' 3 7 In that case, a woman sued Wyeth
131. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. See, e.g., id. at 1194-95 (majority opinion). Before Wyeth, the Supreme Court had not
officially recognized the presumption against preemption in the implied preemption context. See
Note, Chevron and the Substantive Canons: A CategoricalDistinction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 594,
606 (2010).
133. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). The Court specifically identified "state regulation of matters
of health and safety" as one of those areas over which states have "historic primacy." Id at 486.
134. Id. at 485.
135. Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
885 (2000) ("[C]ourt[s) should not find pre-emption too readily in the absence of clear evidence
of a conflict.").
136. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
137. See generally, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, What Tort Theory Tells Us About Federal
Preemption: The Tragic Saga of Wyeth v. Levine, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 485, 485-86
(2010); Eric Policastro, Comment, Saying Goodbye to Implied-Federal Preemption: The
ContemporaryScope of FederalPreemption in Light of Geier, Reigel, and Wyeth, 61 BAYLOR
L. REv. 1028, 1030 (2009). To be sure, Justice Thomas would go even further than the majority.
In his Wyeth concurrence, Justice Thomas noted that he would do away with implied
preemption altogether. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1205 (Thomas, J. concurring). He expressed serious
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Pharmaceuticals to recover damages for injuries suffered as a result of
an adverse reaction to Phenergan, a drug manufactured by Wyeth.13 8
Her injuries stemmed from administration of the drug via the IV-push
method (directly into a vein), as opposed to the IV-drip method
(whereby the drug is first placed into an IV bag).139 Levine brought a
state law failure-to-warn claim, alleging that the manufacturer's
warin should have cautioned against IV-drip administration of the
drug.14 Wyeth argued that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA)
impliedly preempted state law failure-to-warn claims for Phenergan,
and that Wyeth's compliance with applicable federal laws precluded
any recovery. 141
Rejecting Wyeth's implied preemption argument, the Court noted
that "[i]f Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its
objectives, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption
provision . . . ."142 Because Congress failed to expressly preempt the
claims, and because of "its certain awareness of the prevalence of state
tort litigation," there was "powerful evidence that Congress did not
intend FDA oversiqht to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety
and effectiveness. 3
The Court's focus on the presence, or absence, of an express
preemption clause as an important factor in an implied preemption
inquiry may signal a shift toward more restrained preemption
jurisprudence.144 However, the Third Circuit in Farina found
otherwise.145 On a general level, the Farinacourt counseled against an
overly expansive reading of Wyeth on the basis that such a reading
"would come too close to subsuming conflict preemption into
expression preemption analysis." 46 The court also noted various factual
distinctions between the claims at issue in Wyeth and those at issue in
cell phone litigation.147 First, the court found, the longstanding
"complementary role" between state law and the operation of the FDCA
did not exist in the context of regulation of RF emissions.148 Second,
misgivings about a judicial policy that allows a reviewing court to trump the actual text of
federal law on the basis of some generalized notion that state law claims would frustrate
Congressional "purposes and objectives." Id
138. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1191-92.
141. Id. at 1193-94.
142. Id. at 1200.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see also supra note 137.
145. See Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2010).
146. Id. at 130.
147. Id. at 129-30.
148. Id. at 129.

2011]

ARE CELL PHONES SAFE UNTIL THE FCC TELLS US THEYARE NOT? A PREEMPTIONANALYSIS

325

unlike Farina, Wyeth was not a case where the results of agency
balancing were at issue. 149 Accordingly, while FDA labeling
requirements and state tort litigation were both aimed at protecting
public safety, the court found the FCC's regulations more complex
insofar as they reflected an expert balance between public safety and
efficiency concerns. 150
A. Conflict PreemptionPost-Wyeth: A Broad View
The Supreme Court has not yet explicitly clarified the scope of the
doctrine it set forth in Wyeth. Assuming the broadest reading of that
case, all state law claims premised on the adequacy of cell phone
emissions standards would survive a preemption inquiry. Though over
the years Congress expressly preempted certain state law, it seemingly
did not expressly preempt the tort claims at issue in cell phone radiation
litigation. At the same time, Congress inserted savings clauses into both
the FCA and the TCA shielding all remaining state law from
preemption. Therefore, arguably, the structure of both the FCA and the
TCA counsel against a finding of congressional intent to preempt tort
claims.
B. Conflict Preemption Post-Wyeth: A Narrower View
Nonetheless, assuming a narrower reading of Wyeth prevails, as it
did in Farina, further analysis is necessary. A narrower reading of
Wyeth maintains the dividing lines between express and implied
preemption, but does not discount the ex ress preemption and savings
clauses in both the FCA and the TCA. 1 Instead, the various clauses
serve as indicators of congressional intent, which, under either reading
of Wyeth, is the cornerstone of any preemption analysis.' 5 2 However,
the inquiry does not end upon a finding that Congress intended to retain
some state law causes of action.1 53 Instead, a reviewing court must look
further to whether allowing a particular cause of action interferes with
congressional objectives by serving as an "obstacle" to the realization of
those objectives.
As discussed above, the only outward evidence of congressional
149. Id. at 130.
150. Id.
151. The Farinacourt adopted this narrower reading of Wyeth. Id. at 130-31.
152. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194 ("'[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every preemption case."' (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))); Royal,
supra note 61, at 481 ("Congressional intent is ... the lodestar for determining whether state
law is preempted.").
153. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
154. Id.
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intent to preempt is found in two express preemption clauses, one
passed before the TCA's enactment and the other created by the TCA.
The express preemption clauses are counterbalanced by the presence of
two savings clauses contained within the FCA and the TCA. 5 5 The
FCA clause provides that "[n]othing in this chapter ... shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." 56
More forcefully, section 601(c)(1) of the TCA, titled "EFFECT ON
OTHER LAWS," explicitly rejects implied preemption:
(c) FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW(1) No Implied Effect-This Act and the amendments made by
this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede
Federal, State or local law unless expressly so provided in such
Act or amendments. 5 7
Indeed, the legislative history of the TCA corroborates the assertion
that Congress intended to "prevent[] affected parties from asserting that
the bill impliedly preempts other laws."15 8
In cell phone litigation, the weight accorded to those specific
statutory provisions has varied. In Murray, for instance, the D.C. Court
of Appeals essentially dispensed with the savings clauses in one
sentence, affirming that such clauses do not otherwise bar conflict
preemption analysis.159 By contrast, the Pinney court accorded great
weight to the statutory framework and found that it "counsel[ed]
against any broad construction of the goals of [the TCA] that would
create an implicit conflict with state tort law." 60 Finally, though
acknowledging its importance in defining congressional intent, the
Farinacourt referred to the statutory framework as but "one data point
out of many" in analyzing congressional intent.
Regardless of the varying treatment, it seems that all three appellate
courts are in agreement that savings clauses have some bearing on
congressional intent, but do not end the inquiry altogether.
Accordingly, it is apparent that Congress intended to retain some state
telecommunications law, and the next question is whether allowing
155. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(c)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 143
(codified as a note to 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2006)); 47 U.S.C. § 414 (2006).
156. 47 U.S.C. § 414.
157. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 143 (codified as a note to
47 U.S.C. § 152 (2006)).
158. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 201 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
159. Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 778 n.19 (D.C. 2009).
160. Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 458 (4th Cir. 2005).
161. Farina v. Nokia, Inc. 625 F.3d 97, 131-32 (3d Cir. 2010).
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state tort judgments premised on the inadequacy of the FCC's RF
radiation standards nonetheless conflicts with broader congressional
and agency objectives.162 The logic behind this second question is that
it is nearly. impossible for Congress to foresee every possible scenario
in which state law may conflict with proposed federal legislation.163
Although Congress may include a broad savings clause in legislation, a
situation may arise in which a state law claim technically falling within
the savings clause clearly upsets the overall intent behind Congress's
regulatory scheme.1 64 In such instances, a savings provision should not
be interpreted so broadly as to "permit[] [the] law to defeat its own
objectives." 6 5
1. Did Congress Foresee a Possible Conflict?
An additional question is whether Congress actually did foresee the
possibility of concurrent state tort litigation that conflicts with FCC
standards, yet intended for those claims to be subsumed within the
savings clauses.166 Under such circumstances, there is no "conflict"
between congressional purposes and state law because, had Congress
intended otherwise, it "surely would have enacted an express preemption provision" encompassing this type of litigation.16 7 Though the
possibility of state law claims premised on the adequacy of the FCC's
SAR standards are perhaps not as foreseeable as claims against drug
manufacturers like Wyeth, they are not entirely unforeseeable.168
In 1968, Congress passed the Radiation Control for Health and
162. See, e.g., id.
163. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 872 (2000).
164. Id.
165. Id; see also id. (noting that some conflict analysis is necessary because otherwise,
enforcers of a law may be deprived of the "ability to achieve the law's congressionally
mandated objectives that the Constitution, through the operation of ordinary pre-emption
principles, seeks to protect."); Farina, 625 F.3d at 131 ("[A] clarification of intent not to
preempt some state law is not a statement of intent to permit actual conflicts between state and
federal law.").
166. The Supreme Court has stated, "'The case for federal pre-emption is particularly
weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of
federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever
tension there [is] between them."' Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (quoting Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166-67 (1989)) (alteration in original).
167. Id.
168. At a minimum, the FCC recognized the potential for tort litigation. 1996 Report and
Order, supra note 52, at 15128. In its final report instituting the current standards in 1996, the
FCC noted that they received a "significant number" of comments "address[ing] the issue of
Federal preemption of state and local regulations for RF exposure" based on "health and safety
objectives." Id. FCC awareness does not conclusively translate into congressional awareness,
but at least bolsters the argument that Congress was not in the dark.
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Safety Act of 1968 (RCHSA).16 9 Under the RCHSA, Congress
delegated to the FDA the authority, when it deems it "necessary for the
protection of the public health and safety," to "prescribe performance
standards for electronic products to control the emission of electronic
product radiation from such products."' 7 0 The FDA responded to that
delegation of authority by instituting radiation emission limits for
certain consumer devices, such as television receivers in 1970171 and
microwave ovens in 1971.172 Apparently foreseeing the possibility of
litigation and conflicting state laws, Congress included an express
preemption clause in the RCHSA that invalidated any state standard
"not identical to the Federal standard." 73
Congress's experience with the RCHSA serves two significant
functions. First, it demonstrates that Congress was aware of the
possibility of divergent state law with respect to radiation emissions
levels. Second, it demonstrates that Congress knew how to expressly
preempt such state law. When Congress instructed the FCC to enact
regulations regarding radiofrequency radiation, it was not entering
unchartered territory. However, instead of following the same course of
action as it did in the RCHSA by expressly preempting related state law,
Congress did not do so. The logical conclusion is that Congress did not
intend broad-based preemption of state law governing cell phone RF
emissions. If broad-based preemption is to occur, it seems it should be
done by the FDA exercising its authority under the RCHSA.
2. Frustration of Congress's "Purposes and Objectives"?
If reviewing courts are unwilling to stretch beyond the text of a
statute and its accompanying legislative history to ascertain
congressional intent, further preemption analysis is needed. The next
step requires comparing Congress's purposes and objectives in enacting
the FCA and the TCA, and the FCC's objectives in creating its radiation
standards, with the overall effect of state tort litigation on those
objectives. As an initial step, an overview of the various purposes and
objectives at issue is helpful here.
At the time of the FCC's creation, Congress charged the agency with
the duty to create "a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire
169. Pub. L. No. 90-602, 82 Stat. 1173 (1968) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 360hh360ss (2006)).
170. 21 U.S.C. § 360kk(a)(1).
171. 21 C.F.R. § 1020.10 (2010).
172. Id. § 1030.10; see also Microwave Oven Radiation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADM'N,
http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/ResourcesforYouRadiationEmittingProducts/
ucm252762.htm (last updated Apr. 26, 2011).
173. 21 U.S.C. § 360ss.
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and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges." 174 Around 1996, Congress recognized a threat to the nationwide wireless network in the form of inconsistent "State and local
requirements, siting and zoning decisions" fueled by radiation fears.' 7 5
As a result, Congress affirmed that a "high quality national wireless
telecommunications network cannot exist if each of its component[s]
must meet different RF standards in each community." 176
With that problem in mind, Congress passed the TCA in 1996,
thereby broadening the FCC's mandate to include "rules regarding the
environmental effects of radio frequency emissions." 77 According to
the TCA's legislative history, the purpose behind the delegation of
authority was to ensure the establishment of "uniform, consistent
requirements, with adequate safeguards of the public health and
safety."' 78 Congress believed such requirements would "ensure an
appropriate balance in policy and [] speed deployment of the
availability of competitive wireless telecommunications services at a
low price to consumers."1 79
In contrast to the FCC's authority over the technical standards of the
nation's wireless network, however, it is clear that Congress did not
intend the FCC's authority over radio frequency emissions to be
exclusive. Rather, such authority is exercised concurrently with the
The FDA, though not regulating cell phone radiation as a
FDA.'
matter of course, "does have the authority to take action if cell phones
are shown to emit radiofrequency energy (RF) at a level that is
hazardous to the user."181 And, if it chooses to exercise that authority,
the FDA's regulations are clearly preemptive.' 82 While the FCC is the
exclusive authority on technical wireless matters, its authority over
health and safety aspects of cell phones is at all times subject to the
FDA's tacit approval. 83
Just as Congress did not intend to entrust exclusive health and safety
authority in the FCC, based on express preemption clauses and savings
clauses in the FCA and the TCA, it also clearly intended to retain some
174. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 301 (2006).
175. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 94 (1995).
176. Id. at 95.
177. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 704, 110 Stat. 56, 152 (1996).
178. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 94.
179. Id.
180. Cell Phone Overview, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/RadiationEmittingProducts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/HomeBusinessandEntertainment/C
ellPhones/default.htm ("FDA shares regulatory responsibilities for cell phones with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).") (last updated Dec. 2, 2010).
181. 21 U.S.C. § 360ss (2006).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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telecommunications-based state law (or litigation). The intent was made
most clear in the TCA. Congress could have expressly preempted all
non-identical state law and tort litigation, but it opted to preempt only
inconsistent state zoning laws.' 8 That carefully worded express
preemption clause, coupled with a strongly worded savings clause
explicitly disclaiming any implied preemptive effect, weighs against a
finding of implied preemption. As aforementioned, though these factors
alone may not be dispositive from an implied preemption perspective,
they are still powerful sources of congressional intent. This is
particularly true when contrasted with RCHSA, which quite clearly bars
conflicting litigation.
Finally, although "Congress' intent, of course, primarily is discerned
from the language of the . . . statute and the 'statutory framework'

courts do often look to federal agencies for their
surrounding it,'
views on the objectives behind regulations passed pursuant to a
congressional delegation of power.'8 6 The FCC, for its part, defined its
objective as striking "a proper balance between the need to protect the
public and workers from exposure to potentially harmful RF
electromagnetic fields and the requirement that industry be allowed to
provide telecommunications services to the public in the most efficient
According to the FCC, the present
and practical manner possible."
RF emissions standards represent that agency's carefully reasoned
policy judgment that its standards strike that appropriate balance. 8 8
In sum, a common theme throughout the FCA's and TCA's
legislative history is the notion of wireless network uniformity.189
Although the TCA undoubtedly instructed the FCC to regulate cell
phone RF emissions, that authority appears secondary to its primary
responsibility of maintaining the nation's wireless network.
Nonetheless, to exercise that responsibility, the FCC necessarily had to
go undergo a balancing of health and safety concerns against uniformity
concerns. Congress entrusted that balancing in the FCC, and the FCC
claims that such balancing is an important objective of its RF emissions
regulations.
Because the frustration of Congress's "purposes and objectives" is a
fact-specific inquiry, it is useful to analyze the effect of certain tort

184. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2006).
185. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996).
186. See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1134 (2011).
187. Second Memorandum Opinion and Other and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re
Procedures for Reviewing Requests for Relief from State and Local Regulations, 12 FCC Rcd.
13494, 13499 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Second Memorandum Opinion and Order].
188. See Brief of FCC as Amicus Curiae, supranote 127, at 17.
189. See, e.g., id.; 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 301.
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claims separately.190 Where one type of claim may frustrate Congress's
objectives, another may exist harmoniously with those objectives.
However, at the outset, it is important to establish the weight, if any,
accorded to the FCC's determination that state tort law conflicts with
important federal purposes and objectives.
a. FCC's View Regarding the Preemptive Effect of Its Regulations
Although the FCC had the opportunity to address the preemptive
status of its RF radiation regulations early on, it apparently did not think
it necessary at first.191 It was not until 2008 that the FCC determined
that allowing state tort litigation would prevent the FCC from fully
performing the authority delegated to it by Congress.192 Specifically, in
amicus briefing in Murray, the FCC cited the possibility that a
"patchwork of technical standards [] would contravene the federal
policy of creating a 'rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide ...
radio communication service,"' 19 3 and declared all conflicting state law,
or litigation, impliedly preempted.194
An agency's determination that state law adversely affects
congressional objectives is given "some weight,"' 95 the extent of which
is determined by the "thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness" of
the agency's explanation.' 96 This is true even of agency views expressed
in the context of amicus briefing and outside of the formal notice and
comment process.' 97 Nonetheless, the phrase "some weight" means just
190. For purposes of this Note, certain types of claims are highlighted. There may be other
claims available to potential plaintiffs that are not addressed in the Note, such as fraud,
intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, breach of express and implied
warranties, and battery. See, e.g., Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 770-71 (D.C. 2009).
191. 1996 Report and Order, supra note 52, at 15183-84.
192. Brief of FCC as Amicus Curiae at 9-12, Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764
(D.C. 2009) (Nos. 07-1704 to 07-1079). Apparently, the Solicitor General authorized the filing
of an amicus brief in the wake of the Pinney decision in 2005. See Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13 n.22, Farina v. Nokia, Inc., No. 10-1064 (U.S. filed Apr. 29,
2011), 2011 WL 1633941. However, because the Fourth Circuit denied a request for rehearing
en banc, the FCC never had the opportunity to submit its briefing. Id.
193. Brief of FCC as Amicus Curiae, supra note 127, at 14 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151).
194. Id. at 15-18.
195. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000). The FCC's statements on
their own, however, are insufficient to preempt state law as they do not carry with them the
force and effect of law. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 63, at 764.
196. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) (deferring to "an agency's
explanation of how state law affects the regulatory scheme").
197. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) ("The Secretary's interpretation is not rendered
unworthy of deference by the fact that it is set forth in an amicus brief; . .. there is no reason to
suspect that it does not reflect the Secretary's fair and considered judgment."); see also
Williamson v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139 (2011). Although in the
preceding cases, the Court appears to be referring to Chevron deference, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
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what it says. Courts should not simpy "defer[] to an agency's
Instead, a reviewing court
conclusion that state law is pre-empted."
should continue to "perform[] its own conflict determination, relying on
the substance of state and federal law and not on agency proclamations
of pre-emption."' 99 Indeed, the courts in Farina and Murray appear to
have done just that when they rejected the applicability of field
preemption, despite FCC assertions to the contrary.
b. Design Defect Claims 200
As previously established, every preemption inquiry hinges on the
intent of Congress and the views of agencies exercising congressionally
delegated authority. To ascertain Congress's intent, it is important to
isolate the authority under which the FCC instituted its SAR
regulations. Although typically a simple exercise, it is more complex in
this scenario because the FCC appears to have enacted its standards
pursuant to either NEPA or the TCA, or some combination thereof.20 1
The FCC stated in its regulation instituting the SAR standards that
the standards came as "a consequence of Commission responsibilities
under the National Environmental Policy Act to evaluate the
environmental significance of its actions." 202 NEPA is a law generally
applicable to all federal agencies and, as such, reulations enacted
pursuant to it presumably have no preemptive effect.2 0 Therefore, if the
standards resulted solely from the FCC's NEPA obligations, they would
not preempt design defect claims, or any other claims for that matter.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the TCA also imposed substantive

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), the Murray court opted for the less
deferential Skidmore standard. Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 777 n.17 (D.C. 2009)
(citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 576 (2000)).
198. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
199. Id.
200. As this Note makes no attempt to reach the merits of available claims, the general
preemption argument set forth in this section would be applicable to certain other claims such as
breach of express and implied warranties and negligence.
201. This issue arose in Farina,Murray, and Pinney, but the Farina and Murray courts
summarily dismissed the argument. Compare Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 128-29 (3d Cir.
2010), and Murray, 982 A.2d at 778 n.19, with Pinney v. Nokia, Inc. 402 F.3d 430, 457 (4th
Cir. 2005).
202. 47 C.F.R. § 2.1093(a) (2010) (emphasis added); see also 1997 Second Memorandum
Opinion and Order, supra note 187 ("To meet its responsibilities under NEPA, the Commission
has adopted requirements for evaluating the environmental impact of its actions. One of several
environmental factors addressed by these requirements is human exposure to RF energy .... "
(emphasis added)).
203. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24-25, Farina v. Nokia, Inc., No. 10-1064 (U.S.
filed Feb. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 704764.
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obligations on the FCC with respect to RF radiation standards. 204 The
TCA presents a less obvious picture of congressional intent. On the one
hand, the statutory framework suggests undeniable congressional intent
to "save" certain state law from preemption and to expressly preempt
only a very narrow subset of state law. The TCA also reaffirms an
overriding interest in wireless uniformity, with the FCC exercising
primary responsibility for maintaining that uniformity. On the other
hand, the TCA clearly entrusts the FCC with the task of balancing
health and safety concerns against uniformity concerns. And the FCC
has expressed a consistent belief that its balancing responsibilities are a
significant objective of the telecommunications scheme.
Based on the review of congressional purposes and objectives above,
to the extent plaintiffs in state law actions seek lower SAR values by
tort judgment, those claims may be preempted. In response to a tort
judgment entered against them, cell phone manufacturers will probably
respond by lowering the SAR value of their phones sold in that
particular state. As a result, a phone that works in one state may require
more power to work in another state where SAR levels are lower. That
result indirectly upsets Congress's overriding goal of a uniform wireless
network and creates a situation where allowing the claim would
genuinely hinder the full realization of congressional intent.
However, plaintiffs may also allege that cell phones sold without
headsets205 are defective because they expose a user to unsafe levels of
RF radiation.206 As a general matter, allowing those type of claims does
not upset the overarching goal of wireless "uniformity" because the
phones will still operate at the same power level.20 7 Moreover, as those
claims do not fall within the scope of an express preemption clause, and
because the TCA explicitly rejects attempts at implied preemption,
allowing the claims to proceed seemingly does not upset that element of
congressional intent.
These considerations were sufficient for the court in Pinney to reject
the preemption argument and to allow the claims to proceed. 20 In
Murray and Farina,however, the courts were less convinced. 209 Those
courts found that at their core, headset requirements do not differ in any
meaningful way from other design defect claims. 2 10 Rather, all claims
204. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 704, 110 Stat. 56, 152.
205. These could be either non-detachable headsets (that, if removed, prevent the phone
from operating) or normal headsets provided for optional use with the cell phone.
206. These were the claims at issue in Murray and Pinney.
207. Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 458 (4th Cir. 2005).
208. Id.
209. See Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 122 (3d Cir. 2010); Murray v. Motorola, Inc.,
982 A.2d 764, 775 (D.C. 2009).
210. Farina,625 F.3d at 122; Murray, 982 A.2d at 775.
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require the same threshold finding that the FCC standards are unsafe
and that phones compliant with those standards are nonetheless
defective. 2 1 Regardless of whether allowing the claims affected
wireless uniformity, they thwarted congressional and agency intent by
stripping from the FCC the exclusive authority to determine the optimal
structure of the nation's wireless network.21 The Farina and Murray
courts also rejected Pinney's focus on the relief sought instead of on the
nature of the claim.
The courts in Murray and Farina seem to be adopting an overly
formulistic approach to conflict preemption for two reasons. First, it is
not clear that balancing of considerations is a "significant objective" of
the agency's regulations such that they are capable of preempting
conflicting state law. 2 13 Second, even if such considerations were a
"significant objective" of the agency's regulations, they are likely not
significant enough to override what overall would appear to be a
contrary intent.
In a recent Supreme Court case, the Court muddied the implied
preemption waters even more by adding a requirement that state law
must conflict with a "significant objective" of a federal regulation
before preemption is warranted.2 1 4 As a loose framework for that
inquiry, the Court set forth a number of considerations, including (1) a
regulation's history; (2) the "agency's contemporaneous explanation" of
a regulation's objectives; and (3) whether there are "consistently held
inteTretive views" indicating that the objective at issue is an important
one. s In light of these requirements, it is not a foregone conclusion
that balancing is a significant objective of the RF emissions standards.
When issuing its standards, the FCC contemporaneously issued a
statement that the standards struck a "proper balance." 216 However, the
FCC included no express indication that the balancing was an important
part of their regulations. Indeed, the FCC itself underwent no balancing
of its own, and instead relied on standards established by international
standards bodies. 2 17 Nonetheless, since 2008, the FCC has consistently
expressed a belief that its regulations are preemptive based on the
ability of state tort litigation to frustrate the results of agency
balancing. 2 18 Based on the foregoing, it is not entirely clear which way a
211. Farina,625 F.3d at 122; Murray, 982 A.2d at 775, 780-81.
212. Farina,625 F.3d at 122-23; Murray, 982 A.2d at 775, 780-8 1.
213. See Williamson v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1134 (2011).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1139.
216. 1997 Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 187.
217. 1996 Report and Order, supra note 52, at 15134-35.
218. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Farina v. Nokia, Inc., No. 10-1064
(U.S. filed Feb. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 3799082.
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court would go on the "significant objective" issue.
Assuming balancing is a significant objective of the RF emissions
standards, a subsidiary question is whether that objective is strong
enough to override contrary congressional intent. It is true that an
agency's views regarding the preemptive effect of its own regulations
are entitled to "some weight" by reviewing courts, but it seems illogical
that agency proclamations should ever prevail over clear congressional
intent. After all, it is congressional, and not a ency, intent that is the
"ultimate touchstone in every preemption case." 9
As aforementioned, the FDA's concurrent regulation of RF
emissions and the overall statutory scheme helps illuminate
congressional intent. First, Congress did not intend for the FCC to have
unfettered authority to select health and safety standards pertaining to
cell phones. Second, the TCA's legislative history demonstrates that
Congress charged the FCC with the creation of RF radiation standards,
not because of the FCC's expertise in health and safety matters, but
because of perceived threats to the uniform cellular network by
inconsistent "State and local requirements, siting and zoning decisions"
fueled by radiation fears. 2 20 Although Congress could have expressly
preempted all non-identical state law and tort litigation, it opted to
preempt only inconsistent state zoning laws. 22 1 Headset requirements do
not pose any threat to the wireless network, let alone a threat on par
with that caused by state restrictions on the placement of cell phone
towers. In keeping with the overall congressional scheme and with the
strong presumption against preemption, design defect claims premised
on a failure to provide headsets should not be preempted.22 2
c. Failure-to-Warn Claims
It seems more clear that the FCC RF radiation regulations do not
preempt state failure-to-warn claims. Although the FCC balanced
competing safety and efficiency interests in creating its current
emissions standards, it provided a very limited legal framework for the
content of manufacturer warnings. 22 3 The FCC requires only that a
219. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
220. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 94 (1995).
221. Id. at 95.
222. A plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits is beyond the scope of this Note. In
Florida, prevailing on a design defect claim requires expert testimony demonstrating that "(1) a
defect existed in the product, (2) the defect caused the injury, and (3) the defect in the product
existed at the time the product left the possession of the manufacturer." Cooper v. Old
Williamsburg Candle Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223 (M.D. Fla. 2009). In light of the
scientific uncertainty surrounding cell phone health effects, causation will likely be a major
stumbling block in this class of claims.
223. If anything, the FCC prescribes only the form in which warnings may appear. 47
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"users manual or instruction manual for an intentional or unintentional
radiator . . . caution the user that changes or modifications . . . could

void the user's authority to operate the equipment."224 However, this
sort of general warning requirement is insufficient to preempt state law
and relieve cell phone manufacturers of a duty to warn about anything
other than user modification. 225 Moreover, it seems implausible that
federal law can preempt state claims based on a manufacturer's failure
to warn about risks the FCC expressly acknowledges on its website.2 2 6
Even though the FCC considers cell phones that are in compliance to be
safe, warning of potential risks that the FCC admits exist does not
require a threshold finding that a phone is unsafe.2 2 7
Although this Note does not attempt a thorough analysis of the
likelihood of a plaintiffs success in bringing a failure to warn claim,
such claims involve a deeper analysis of the warning or lack thereof.
Under Florida law, "[t]he mere existence of warnings is not dispositive
of the adequacy of the warnings . .. ."228 Therefore, Florida requires a

secondary inquiry into whether the warning suffered from "inadequate
wording," or whether it was in a location not readily apparent to the
user.2 29
A typical cell phone's safety instructions may suffer from both of
those inadequacies. For example, the iPhone 3G Product Information
Guide leaves any mention of RF radiation to the sixth page and never
expressly addresses any potential health risks associated with RF
radiation.2 3 0 Instead, the manual merely suggests ways that concerned
users can limit their exposure. 23 1 Although the safety manual provides
the SAR values for its products and presents those values in a side-byside comparison to the FCC maximum authorized levels, it makes no
real effort to explain what the SAR values mean. 232 Additionally, Apple
C.F.R. § 15.21 (2010). The FCC authorizes cell phone manufacturers to provide operating
manuals in non-traditional formats, such as on a computer disk or through the Internet. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996) (finding federal labeling
requirements reflecting "entirely generic concerns about device regulation generally" not
preempted).
226. For example, the FCC acknowledges that it "cannot rule out the possibility" of health
risks from radiation to the brain and proposes various methods by which a user can reduce
overall exposure. FCC RF FAQ, supra note 5.
227. Recall that this was the deciding factor in Farinaand Murray. See supra note 189.
228. Brown v. Glade & Grove Supply, Inc., 647 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
229. Id.
230. iPhone 3G Important Product Information Guide, supra note 4, at 6.
231. Id. at 7.
232. Id. at 6. Apple defines the specific absorption rate as "a unit of measurement," but
never explains what exactly it is measuring (i.e. the rate at which a user's body may absorb
radiation).
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saves until page seven the warning that the iPhone's radiation emissions
"may exceed the FCC exposure guidelines for body-worn operation if
positioned less than 15 mm (5/8 in.) from the body (e.g., when carrying
iPhone in your pocket)." 233 As a large number of cell phone users
habitually carry cell phones in their pockets, one must question the loic
of leaving such a warning until the seventh page of a safety manual.
d. Municipal and State Legislative Enactments
The most recent challenges to cell phone safety have occurred at the
state and local government level, not before the courts.2 35 San Francisco
was one of the first cities to address cell phone safety by passing a "Cell
Phone Right-to-Know Ordinance" in 2010.236 In its original form, the
ordinance required that all cell phone retailers publicly displaying their
products also display a variety of information pertaining to that
product's SAR value. 37 The ordinance also called for the provision of
factsheets to consumers describing SAR values and informing
customers of ways to minimize radiation exposure. 238 Following San
Francisco's lead, legislatures in Oregon and the California cities of
Burlingame and Arcata introduced similar legislation.2 39
233. Id. at 7.
234. These same arguments would likely support a claim under a state consumer
protection statute as well. Although this Note does not address consumer protection claims,
these claims would likely not be preempted, as the Murray court found.
235. Concern over cell phone warnings has not been limited to state governments. In fact,
on June 30, 2010, Representative Dennis Kucinich formally announced his intent to introduce a
bill in Congress to create a new national research program on the health risks of cell phone
radiation, to compel reconsideration of the current SAR standards, and to mandate specific
warning labels on cell phones. Press Release, Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich, supra note 23.
Specifically, Kucinich said that "[c]onsumers have a right to know whether they are buying the
phone with the lowest-or the highest-level of exposure to cells phone radiation." Id.
(quotation mark omitted).
236.

S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 155-10 (Jan. 7, 2011).

237. Id. §§ 1103-04 (requiring display, either next to display phones or on a nearby poster,
of "(1) the SAR value of that phone and the maximum allowable SAR value for cell phones set
by the FCC; (2) [a] statement explaining what a SAR value is; and (3) [a] statement that
additional educational materials regarding SAR values and cell phones use are available from
the cell phone retailer," in a manner specified by the San Francisco Department of the
Environment).
238. Id. § 1104.
239. Olga Kharif, San Francisco Phone-RadiationLaw Sparks Proposals in Calhfornia,
Oregon, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 5, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08Even before
05/san-francisco-s-phone-radiation-law-may-win-followers-in-other-cities.html.
San Francisco passed its ordinance, state legislatures in California and Maine considered similar
legislation. See, e.g., San Francisco Passes Cell Phone Radiation Law, BBC NEWS (June 23,
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8756996.stm. Due to what many believe was
heavy lobbying from the cell phone industry, the proposed laws did not pass. Id.
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The cell phone industry, for its part, did not respond kindly to the
passage of the ordinance. Acting through its powerful lobbying group,
CTIA-The Wireless Association, the industr promptly cancelled its
trade show scheduled in the city for Fall 20102 0 and instituted an action
in federal court.241 In its lawsuit, the CTIA alleged, inter alia, that the
FCC regulations preempt the San Francisco ordinance on the familiar
242
basis of conflict preemption. The CTIA took particular exception to
the ordinance's provisions pertaining to SAR values. Although up until
last year, the FCC had long-advocated the practice of comparing phone
SAR values as a means for reducing radiation exposure, the agency
recently decided such a comparison was not only availing, but also
misleading.2 4 3
In a likely effort to avoid litigation, San Francisco temporarily
shelved its ordinance until issuing an amended version in July 2011 .2 4
In its amended form, the ordinance removed all references to SAR
values or to any SAR disclosure requirements. 245 Instead, the ordinance
now requires dissemination of "informational poster[s]," "informational
factsheet[s] and "informational statements," all of which must "inform
consumers of issues pertaining to radiofrequency energy emissions from
cell phones and actions that can be taken by cell phone users to
minimize exposure to radiofrequency energy."24
In October 2011, the CTIA filed a second amended complaint
challenging the amended ordinance and moved for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin San Francisco from enforcing its ordinance. Again,
the complaint alleged conflict preemption.2 4 7 The core of CTIA's
240. See Kang, supra note 2.
241. First Amended Complaint at 26-27, CTIA-The Wireless Ass'n v. City of S.F. (N.D.
Cal. July 23, 2010) (No. 10-03224).
242. The complaint also alleges field preemption. Id. at 25.
243. See Cecilia Kang, FCC Changes Cell Phone Safety Guidance, WASH. PosT, Oct. 1,
2010, at Al7; FCC/CGB Secretly Flip-Flops on Decade Old SAR Policy, SPECTRUM TALK
(Sept. 24, 2010, 10:40 AM), http://www.marcus-spectrum.com/Blog/files/CGB-onSAR. html
(providing cached versions of old website and new website). This update, occurring right around
the time that the CTIA filed its lawsuit against the City of San Francisco, led to many
allegations of FCC/CTIA collusion. Id.
244.

S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 155-10 (amended July 11, 2011), available at http://www.

sfbos.orglftpluploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/bosagendas/materials/bag071911_1 10656.pdf.
245. Id.; see also Second Amended Complaint at 18, CTIA-The Wireless Ass'n v. City
of S.F. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2011) (No. 10-03224).
246. S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 155-10, §§ 1103-04 (amended July 11, 2011). The ordinance
requires display of the posters "in a prominent location visible to the public, within the retail
store." Id. § 1103(a). The factsheets are to be "provided to any customer who requests it,
regardless of whether they purchase a cell phone or not." Id. § 1103(b). Finally, the statements
must be included along with display materials in retail stores, and must satisfy certain
formatting and text requirements. Id.
247. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 245. In addition to field preemption,
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preemption argument is that the ordinance impermissibly challenges the
FCC's determination that SAR-compliant phones are safe and, by doing
so, upsets the balance the FCC struck between public safety and an
efficient nationwide wireless network.2 4 8 In disrupting the balance, the
ordinance indirectly frustrated the congressional purpose of creating a
uniform national wireless communications network spearheaded by the
FCC. 249
The court should not accept the CTIA's argument. Regulating the
manner in which warnings are to be displayed does not change the
substance of the warning. The proposed informational factsheet, rather
than referring to cell phones as "unsafe," merely restates what the FCC
itself espouses on its website2 5 0 and even cites to the FCC's website.2 5 1
At most, the ordinance compels cell phone companies to present
consumer warning information in a more transparent and accessible
25
way.252 In doing so, the ordinance does not upset any balance struck by
the FCC, nor does it disrupt the wireless communications network.
Indeed, rather than hinder the FCC's ability to carry out its
congressionally delegated goals, the San Francisco ordinance actually
bolsters the FCC's furtherance of its goals. In 2001, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), Congress's "watchdog," 253 conducted an
investigation into mobile phone safety at the behest of two members of
Congress.254 One question that the congressmen asked the GAO to
investigate was, "What key actions are federal agencies taking to inform
the public about issues related to mobile phone health effects?" 255 After
conducting its investigation, the GAO concluded that the FCC
"provide[s] the public with information on radiofrequency exposure
issues, but do[es] not meet general consumers' needs for clear and
defendants also brought First Amendment and Section 1983 claims. Id.
248. Id. at 25-26.
249. Id.
250. For example, the FCC also recommends, explicitly or implicitly, each of the
precautionary measures included on the San Francisco consumer factsheet. See Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, FCC Consumer Facts: Wireless Devices and Health Concerns,
FED.

COMMC'NS

COMM'N,

http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/mobilephone.html

(last

updated Sept. 20, 2010); FCC Encyclopedia:FAQS-Wireless Phones, supranote 15.
251. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 245, at Ex. E, available at
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/fiLE_4_60-1_ExA-E-toPrelimInj.Motion.pdf
252. Kharif, supra note 239 (quoting City Attorney Dennis Herrera as saying, "The
ordinance affords consumers the same information they can find on the FCC website or
elsewhere . . . ." and "all the city want[s] to do is make sure that information is out there in a
transparent way").
253.

About GAO, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/about/index.

html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). Located in the legislative branch, the GAO monitors and
protects congressional interest.
254.

U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 20, at 1-2.

255.

Id. at 2.
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concise information." 256 With respect to the FCC's explanation of SAR
values, the GAO noted that the SAR levels are presented to the public
on the FCC's website in a way that "would baffle most consumers."2 5 7
The GAO then noted that "[t]hese shortcomings are cause for concern
because the industry is including ... FCC's consumer information with
new mobile phones." 258 Essentially, the GAO expressed a concern with
respect to exactly the same issue that the San Francisco ordinance seeks
to address.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although the health risks associated with long-term exposure to
radiation from cell phones are now uncertain, as science progresses, the
coming years will likely provide more insight. It is a mistake, though, to
assume that the present scientific uncertainty renders today's cell phone
litigation unimportant. Regardless of the attenuated causal linkages at
this stage, conflict preemption may serve as an absolute bar to future
meritorious claims. With this in mind, absent clear Supreme Court
guidance, future courts must look deeper into congressional and agency
intent and grapple with the uncertain legal status of conflict preemption.
Outside the realm of tort litigation, the way courts treat legislative
enactments such as the San Francisco cell phone ordinance will also be
important. Should the CTIA prevail in its preemption argument,
subsequent municipal enactments in other cities may be less
attractive.259 As a result, cell phone manufacturers will have little
incentive to prominently warn against the risks of radiation and may
even actively withhold, or hide, health information. The costs from the
perspective of consumer awareness are obvious. Cell phone safety
inserts are already virtually indecipherable to the average user and risk
becoming even more so if the law comes out firmly in favor of cell
phone manufacturers. Conversely, should the City of San Francisco
prevail, one would expect other municipalities and states to follow
suit.2 60 If enough states and municipalities pass similar legislation, and
as more information becomes available to cell phone users, hopefully

256. Id. at 28.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 26.
259. Although the district court decision will not be legally binding on cities outside of the
Northern District of California's jurisdiction, it may create a disincentive for other
municipalities or states considering similar legislation.
260. Indeed, some already have. See Kharif,supra note 239 (quoting a lawmaker in the
California city of Burlingame as saying, "We ought to seriously consider following San
Francisco's lead . . . .").
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users will be in a position to make informed decisions that may prevent
future tragedy.

342

JOURNAL OFTECHNOLOGYLAW

& POLICY

[Vol. 16

